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Can Negative EV Gambling be Rational?
An Analysis of a Doubling Scheme for Roulette
David Edelman
It is well-known (e.g., Wald (1947)) that complicated betting strategies and stop-
ping times cannot turn unfavourable games into favourable ones. While economists
tend to attribute individuals' willingness to play such games to irrationality (as might
be modeled by increasing marginal utility, for example) the present paper presents
an example which suggests an alternative model, one which suggests that negative
expected-value (EV) gamblers may in some instances be behaving rationally after all.
It is a practical fact that with regard to personal finances, individuals' effective
time value of money differs greatly, depending primarily on their level of personal
wealth. An individual with no equity who needs to borrow might be able to obtain an
unsecured loan for a limited amount, at an interest rate which is somewhat higher than
current short-term interest rates. By contrast, an individual with equity, on the other
hand, will generally be able to obtain secured credit at a rate just above the current
interest rate. An individual who is wealthy enough to not need borrowing, but rather
has money to invest will generally be able to earn a rate just below the current interest
rate. Thus, it appears that generally the less well-off an individual is, the higher that
individual's effective discount rate characterising time value of money.
In what follows below, an analysis of a particularly popular 'doubling scheme' will
be analysed from this point of view, and it will be shown that for a sufficiently high
discount rate such a scheme, while having a decidedly negative EV, will have a positive
net present value (NPV), and may be thought of as a method of 'time leveraging'.
An Example
Consider the doubling strategy in which a gambler plays Roulette repeatedly,
betting on 'Black', doubling bets until a win occurs. Let p < ~ be the probability of
'Black' occurring on a single play, and suppose cash flows are discounted at rate r per
play. For notational ease, let a = l~r'
If the gambler has enough capital for a maximum of N plays, the Expected Net
Present Value of Return is given by
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If p in the above equation were 1and a were 1, the expectation would reduce to
regardless of N.
Returning to the more general expression, the NPV equals
1 1
= (1 - 2N ) - (1 - 2N ) = 0,
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If a(l - p) < 1, then as the Horizon N increases, the above expression tends to
Thus, it appears that the NPV is positive even if p < ~, provided a < 2(1 - p).
In this case, instead of exhibiting increasing marginal utility, it is plausible that
gamblers might be optimising NPV, but exhibiting 'impatience', as modeled by a dis-
count factor a which could be significantly less than 1. This might also explain why
gambling as a phenomenon is more prevalent among lower income groups, whose effec-
tive personal discount rate is the highest.
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